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CIA/SAVA /WVIND 700117



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 17 January 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

Top Sur


SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



OCTOBER 1969 - JANUARY 1970 weekly data as reported





week's 98 to 85 for this week.







last week to a reported 175. The official totals will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN for these periods.







groups and one smaller with a combined strength of 3,860. Additionally, three battalion-size and two smaller "gap fill" groups have been accepted, raising the total pipeline input since 23 October to some 26,000 to 27,700.






to 444 for this week. Although not spectacular, this is the second consecutive week that enemy initiated incidents have declined.





1,797 from the previous week's 2.552.





centage of enemy killed by RVN forces decreased from last week's 42% to this week's 40%.

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Enemy Activity

The enemy continued to maintain the same low posture that has characterized his activity for almost a month. His efforts were largely confined to a mix of scattered, light probes against friendly installations, attacks by fire against fixed points, or terrorist activity directed against the civil population. The bulk of this week's enemy-initiated activity was the work of his local forces or sapper units. Main force units, for the most part, continue to remain deep in base areas or the Cambodian sanctuary engaging in resupply and refitting activity for another phase of his Winter-Spring Campaign -- possibly later this month or early in February.

Enemy Infiltration

Inputs into the infiltration pipeline rose sharply during the week. Five battalion-size groups, totalling about 3,000, were detected in North Vietnam. Three other groups were observed in Laos, all previously included in the estimate as "gap fill" groups. So far in January, 13 infiltration groups have been detected moving south. It is still too early to make any firm judgments about whether we are now seeing the beginning of a large surge of infiltration activity or only an isolated burst of activity. We should, however, have a clearer picture sometime in the next two weeks as to the meaning of this week's activity.

25X1B



South Vietnam Developments

25X1X6



(ARVN) forces while six new military region commanders of equal (i.e., three star) rank would be appointed and be responsible for the non-regular or "territorial" forces, such as the Regional and Popular Forces, engaged in the pacification effort. There would be one region commander in I Corps, one in III Corps, two in II Corps, and two in IV Corps. The plan has both military and political implications. Thieu professes to believe that the new structure is more compatible with the process of Vietnamization and would permit each commander to concentrate on his main task.

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It would also reduce the present extensive powers of the corps commanders, possibly reduce their opportunities for corruption, and improve morale in ARVN by permitting the rise of six able, young officers to Lieutenant General rank. Thieu undoubtedly also has in mind the political advantages of having the pacification apparatus under generals who owe their position to him and who would support his objectives during the 1970 and 1971 elections. Thieu reportedly has also reassigned 14 province chiefs and several general officers, including the II Corps Commander, General Lu Mong Lan, who is often alleged to be heavily involved in corruption. Thieu's motives in initiating such a reshuffle of command positions are probably similar to those prompting his interest in the corps/region reorganization. Though some of Thieu's reasons may be valid, there are dangers in developing a complex set of parallel and overlapping command lines. Divided command authority has long plagued pacification efforts at the province level, especially when the province chief has had authority over the RF and PF within his province but has not had operational control over the ARVN units operating therein. The provincial precedent suggests that while such a corps/region reorganization may clip the wings of corps commanders, it is not likely to register a net increase in the overall efficiency of the GVN's anti-VC effort.

Communist Developments

believes that Hanoi's unusual concern over security and morale, as reflected in the press and other sources during the past year, stems from three basic causes: 1) the generation gap; 2) the relaxation of tensions and the expectation of a better life following the bombing halt; and 3) strains on the economy and on morale arising from shifts of population and shortages of housing, food, and fuel. Large numbers of young people are openly rebellious, are uncommitted to the war or the regime, and are increasingly refusing to register for the draft. Black marketing and corruption involving consumer goods have become common. Special strains arising from urban overcrowding, inefficient government services, and supply shortages are serious enough to have warranted special attention in the press. While one might be tempted to conclude that these problems forecast a weakening of the regime, the diplomat warns that this is probably not so. The people have neither the power nor will to bring about any major changes in the major policies of their rulers, and the regime's reaction, aside from token gestures, has been to strengthen its controls over the population.

Other Developments

Enemy communications reveal that the expected January surge in Communist logistics activity in Laos is underway, and that some units are ahead of their plan. Increased supply activity began in early December, about a month earlier than the last dry season. This early start, and the increased tempo in the Panhandle and toward South Vietnam, has probably resulted from the significant drawing-down of stockpiles during the heavy rains in Laos last summer and from the temporary halt in supplies from Cambodia. Meanwhile, reports indicate that the Cambodians are continuing to release significant quantities of munitions to the Communists from stocks accumulated during the period prior to last September when the embargo was in effect, although they are reportedly resisting Communist efforts to send additional shipments into Sihanoukville.

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